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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Alston Johnson*
Developments in workers' compensation during the past year
have centered on interpretations of the new disability standards and
delineation of the "intentional act" exception in the Act permitting
an injured worker to proceed in tort. Only one piece of legislation of
any consequence affected the Compensation Act. Act 827 provides
specifically that householders are not liable in compensation to their
employees whom they engage for labor other than in a trade,
business or occupation. 1 Though non-coverage for domestic
employees was probably clear under the language of the Act prior
to amendment, Act 827 is indubitably an effort to overrule
legislatively the implication from Morgan v. Equitable General Life
Insurance Co.' that a domestic employee could seek compensation
against the householder who employed him or her.
DISABILITY STANDARDS: THE ODD-LOT DOCTRINE

Just before publication of last year's symposium article, the
supreme court adopted the odd-lot doctrine as the method of interpreting the new disability standards under the Act. No occasion was
then presented for extended comment on the subject.3 Passage of a
year permits the formulation of a very rough outline of what the
Louisiana doctrine might be, though obviously considerable judicial
interpretation remains to be done.

Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. 1981 La. Acts, No. 827 adds sub-section B to LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950). to read as
follows:
There is exempt from coverage under this Chapter all labor, work, or services
performed by any employee of a private residential householder in connection
with the private residential premises of such householder and which labor, work,
or services are not incidental to and do not arise out of any trade, business, or occupation of such householder . . . . [Alny person who is engaged in the trade,
business, or occupation of furnishing labor, work, or services to private residential
premises shall be liable under the provisions of this Chapter to his employees or
their dependents for injury or death arising from and incidental to their employment in rendering such labor, work, or services.
2. 383 So. 2d 1067 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980). See Johnson, Developments in the
Law, 1979-1980- Workers' Compensation, 41 LA. L. REv. 557, 564-68 (1981).
3. See Johnson, supra note 2. at 557.
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Initial Judicial Reaction
The initial judicial reaction to the new standards for determining disability was to choose the path of least resistance. The
pre-1975 working-in-pain cases were handy and easy to deal with,
and to these cases the courts first turned to resolve disability
claims.
Under the standards prior to 1975, a finding that the worker
could return to his former job only by working in substantial pain
was equivalent to a finding that the worker was unable to return to
his former job at all, and thus was a basis for an award of benefits
based on total and permanent disability. It was reasonable to
predict that this jurisprudence would continue to be viable under
the new standard,' since nothing was said in the 1975 amendment
about a worker who might continue his employment in substantial
pain. However, caution was indicated in the application of the principle, since the substantial increase in benefits and the emphasis on
partial disability in the 1975 amendments suggested that a more
rigorous view of the working-in-pain claim should be taken.'
The first cases reported after the 1975 amendments tilled the
familiar ground of working in pain, but ignored the suggestion of a
more rigorous view of.such claims. For the most part, the judicial
reaction to the new standard was to treat it much as if it were the
old standard, as modified by the earlier cases. Awards based upon
total and permanent disability were affirmed on what were in some
instances relatively weak showings of working in pain.6
When used in conjunction with the new standard, the allegation
of working in pain becomes very subjective and amorphous indeed.
The judiciary seemed to realize that it had chosen a tool for inter4.

1 W. MALONE
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JOHNSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE §

277 in 13 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1980).

5. ICE
6.

Downs v. Rapides Gen. Hosp., 398 So. 2d 116 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) (plaintiff

particularly credible in pain complaints); Kraemer v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 393
So. 2d 346 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Irby v. Edwards Rental & Fishing Tools, Inc., 380
So. 2d 711 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Richard v. Standard Fittings, 379 So. 2d 33 (La.

App. 3d Cir. 1979); Schriner v. Riverside Companies, Inc., 378 So. 2d 1035 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 380 So. 2d 1360 (La. 1980); Lemoine v. Employers Cas. Co., 378
So. 2d 594 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Guidry v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 376
So. 2d 352 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979) (partial disability); Jones v. Arnold, 371 So. 2d 1258
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Bonnette v. Travelers Ins. Co., 367 So. 2d 1261 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1979). A somewhat more rigorous view of the working-in-pain concept was taken
in Lanieux v. Iberville Services, Inc., 391 So. 2d 1282 (La. App. 1st Cir.). cert. denied,
394 So. 2d 1248 (La. 1980).
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preting the new disability standard which was not sophisticated
enough for the task. The supreme court, in Whitaker v. Church's
Fried Chicken, Inc.,' appeared to recognize that working in substantial pain, though an important factor, was only part of a larger picture: the ability to engage in a gainful occupation for wages in the
current labor market. The Whitaker opinion, looking forward as it
did to the adoption of the odd-lot doctrine, proved to be a necessary
step in the evolution of the judiciary's reaction to the new disability
standard.
Adoption of the Odd-Lot Doctrine
While the working-in-pain cases were being decided, other cases
grouped together the factors which were the foundation of the oddlot doctrine without specifically adopting it by name. In Goodwin v.
Stathes, for example, the trial court had found the employee to be
partially disabled and he appealed, seeking to be classified as totally
disabled. The appellate court noted that the employee was a painter
and sandblaster, the only work he had ever known; that he was illiterate, barely competent in basic mathematics; and that he could
not read street signs or maps. Taking into account both his injury
and his lack of education and job skills, and citing expert evidence
of his employability, the court held that he was totally disabled
because he "cannot compete in the labor market and cannot engage
in any gainful occupation for wages."'
In the Whitaker opinion itself, mentioned above, the supreme
court also noted the factors underlying the odd-lot doctrine in
reaching a conclusion of total disability, even though the majority
opinion did not mention the doctrine.'" Young Whitaker was, in fact,
the classic odd-lot worker except for his age. He was sixteen years
old at the time of his injury-severe burns to his legs while attempting to dispose of hot grease. Sear tissue and accompanying pain and
discomfort resulted from the injury. His treating physician felt that
he could only work in a controlled environment in an "indoor sedentary type of occupation." Exposure to heat and humidity would be
particularly painful and disabling. But Whitaker finished only four
grades of elementary school before entering special vocational education. He had worked as a janitor. But as the court noted, the skills
required for indoor work would be beyond his "meager abilities." An
7.
8.
9.
10.
should

387 So. 2d 1093 (La. 1980).
381 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1331.
387 So. 2d 1093 (La. 1980). Dennis, J., concurring, suggested that the case
have been decided under the odd-lot doctrine. Id. at 1097.
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expert in job placement felt his job possibilities would be limited to
the public sector, where such handicaps were more likely to be
tolerated. In fact, the expert noted that Whitaker's present employment was at a local zoo. The court held that Whitaker was entitled
to an award for total disability, noting his pain and describing his
situation as follows: "he had held a succession of jobs and has not remained long with any one employer. Whitaker is a marginal
employee, at best .... ""
The Whitaker opinion was itself followed in the lower appellate
courts as the latest pronouncement on the subject.'" Some appellate
judges openly suggested adoption of the odd-lot doctrine. 3 Finally,
in an important trilogy of decisions, the supreme court firmly
adopted the odd-lot doctrine as the guiding principle in determination of total and permanent disability.
The clearest of these is Oster v. Wetzel Printing, Inc." The
claimant was a 61-year-old lady who had suffered an injury which required amputation of portions of two fingers of her right hand. She
was a bookbinder by trade, and knew no other. She had no education past the first year of junior high school, and her employer did
not retain her after her injury. Evidence indicated that two years of
psychotherapy might restore her mental, and therefore employment,
capabilities; but she was a poor risk for such therapy because of her
age. The court also entertained some doubt about who might pay for
such therapy. There was no evidence of her employability from the
employer's side, and only a limited amount of medical evidence suggesting some employment capabilities. A commissioner had granted
benefits on the basis of total and permanent disability, but the trial
and appellate courts had concluded otherwise. The supreme court
restored the total and permanent disability award, noting that the
claimant's age, lack of education and the nature of her injury placed
her in the odd-lot category, and that no evidence of employability in
other fields had been adduced. As for the use of the odd-lot doctrine
in future cases, the court stated:
Thus, for all the reasons stated above and because we consider
the doctrine to be consistent with the underlying policy and purpose of our workers' compensation statute, and essential to its
11.

1d. at 1096.

12. Gaspard v. Aetna Ins. Co., 390 So. 2d 243 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
13. Rushing v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 391 So. 2d 864, 869 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1980) (Stoker, J.. concurring).
14. 390 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1980). See generally as to odd-lot workers, Johnson, supra
note 2, and Johnson, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977.1978
Term-Workmen's Compensation, 39 LA. L. REv. 881, 883-93 (1979).
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interpretation in accordance with the compensation principle, we
conclude that the odd-lot doctrine should be employed as the
guiding concept in determining permanent total disability."
In Turner v. American Mutual Insurance Co.," the doctrine was
used again, but resulted in a remand to afford the employer the opportunity to introduce evidence of other work available to the claimant in the job market. The claimant was a 20-year-old black male,
mentally retarded, who had been injured in his work as a woodcutter. He suffered a crushed foot and could not drive or stand for long
periods. An industrial psychologist and vocational rehabilitation expert suggested several things he might do in the job market which
were of a sedentary nature. The supreme court found the evidence
on that poifit vague, and remanded for further elucidation on the
subject. The court noted that the claimant "lives in the small town
of Simmesport," no doubt an indication that the court thought his
job possibilities in the area of his residence might be limited.
Finally, in Dusang v. Henry C. Beck Builders, Inc.," the court
seemed to use the doctrine but found the requirements for odd-lot
status unsatisfied on the facts before the court. Thus the appropriate conclusion was partial rather than total disability. The
claimant, a welder whose age was not given, was injured but had
returned to work at the same job. He claimed to be working in
substantial and appreciable pain, but the supreme court observed
that it was less than in Whitaker and that the claimant was not the
"marginal employee" in terms of education and industrial experience
that Whitaker had been. Accordingly, he was not an "odd-lot"
worker, and therefore had only established partial disability.
Numerous subsequent decisions have applied the doctrine,
either to award total disability'8 or to determine that the claimant
15. 390 So. 2d at 1324.
16. 390 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1980).
17. 389 So. 2d 367 (La. 1980).
18. Taintor v. Standard Supply & Hardware Co., Inc., 398 So. 2d 1269 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1981) (back injury to 42-year-old warehouseman; high school graduate with
some clerical skills; had only held one job, with federal government, since his injury
and it was subject to abolition without notice because it was temporary work; some
evidence of substantial pain); Lee v. Pratt-Farnsworth Constr. Co., Inc., 397 So. 2d 2
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (ankle injury to 33-year-old truck driver; thereafter held job
with friendly employer who permitted him extended work periods; eighth-grade education, no industrial history except as truck driver; occupational therapist testified that
employment opportunities were limited to "sheltered" jobs where employers would

make concessions to accommodate his injury; employer offered no evidence of
employability or jobs available); Celestine v. Henry Indus., Inc., 394 So. 2d 1260 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1981) (50-year-old semi-literate diesel mechanic with seventh-grade education suffered serious leg injury when run over by cement truck; had worked in that
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has not made out a prima facie case of odd-lot status and should be
entitled at best to an award based on partial disability."9 In some instances, the doctrine required a remand of the case for taking further evidence on the point."0
Parameters of the Doctrine, and Future Problems
It is too early to delineate completely the ultimate parameters
of the odd-lot doctrine or to suggest how it might differ from similar
doctrines in other states. But the decisions do support some initial
suggestions about the future elaboration of the concept.
The odd-lot doctrine is not a panacea. It is not a magic wand
which will instantly make the knotty problems of determination of
the extent of disability disappear. Rather, it is a method of judicial
analysis permitting the consideration of a number of factors to reach
a conclusion about the ultimate role of an injured worker in the
economy. No one factor should be conclusive, though clearly one or
more may predominate in a given case. The factors considered in
field and no other for 30 years; permanent degenerative knee problems thereafter; occupational therapist tested claimant and testified that he might be able to undertake
"small engine repairs, laundromat management, locksmith work" or possibly work at a
self-service gasoline station; cross-examination revealed he might need retraining for
some of these in some instances, modification to his home, and might require
assistance in the bookkeeping end of the business); Wilson v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 393
So. 2d 1248 (La. 1981) (back injury with complication of phlebitis; female high school
graduate with vocational training as secretary, in her early 30s; strong evidence of
substantial pain, and pre-existing condition combining with her disc problem; court
held that working-in-pain concept is "merely an embodiment of the broader concept expressed in the odd-lot doctrine"; even though she was not the ordinary odd-lot candidate, her pain was the decisive factor; case could be re-opened if regular employment
became available to her); Graham v. Jones Bros. Co., Inc., 393 So. 2d 861 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1981) (older worker, thereafter employed only by friend; ability to work appeared
to decrease steadily after his injury; entitled to benefits based on total and permanent
disability, apparently on basis of odd-lot doctrine though the term was not used as
such); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Mitchell, 392 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (back
injury to 47-year-old manual laborer with fourth grade education; some pain, employment only in family-owned business; combination of factors led to his classification in
odd-lot category; insufficient evidence from employer's side to show regular work
available in job market); Lemoine v. Marksville Indus., Inc., 391 So. 2d 528 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1981) (back and shoulder injury to 47-year-old widow; tried several jobs but
pain was a factor; said to be a close question, but odd-lot applied; re-opening suggested
if situation changed).
19. Allor v. Belden Corp., 393 So. 2d 1233 (La. 1981) (odd-lot treatment denied to
31-year-old male with back injury; only permanent partial disability since the medical
evidence was supportive of other jobs, and he had other experience; high school
graduate with varied work experience as heavy equipment and truck operator,
bartender, service station manager and cook); Calogero v. City of New Orleans, 397 So.
2d 1252 (La. 1980).
20. Lattin v. Hica Corp., 395 So. 2d 690 (La. 1981).
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cases already decided need not be considered an exclusive listing.
The utility of the doctrine is that it will permit a reasoned consideration of the totality of the employment picture, and it will lose
that usefulness if it is frozen into some kind of formula. It is by
nature designed to be applied in specific factual situations.
Having added this caveat, one may attempt a cautious description of the factors which could be important in determining whether
a prima facie case for classification in the odd-lot category has been
made out by an injured worker. Certainly one might want to consider in a given case some of the following factors:
-the extent of actual physical impairment, including complications from pre-existing conditions; 1
-the 2degree
of pain following the injury;"
3
- age;
-

industrial history;

21. Weller v. Brown, 398 So. 2d 551 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1979) (pre-existing condition
complicated injury; award based on total and permanent disability); Celestine v. Henry
Indus., Inc., 394 So. 2d 1260 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (physical impairment would make
it difficult for claimant to travel very far to obtain employment); Wilson v. Ebasco Ser-

vices, Inc., 393 So. 2d 1248 (La. 1981) (complications from pre-existing phlebitis made
injury totally disabling). See Janness v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 8 Ore. App. 95, 493
P.2d 73 (1972) (a claimant who possesses the mental capacity necessary to be retrained
might not be physically able to withstand the rehabilitation program; claimant not likely
to be able to sit longer than half an hour); Dale Motels, Inc. v. Crittenden, 50 Ala. App.
227, 278 So. 2d 370 (1973) (claimant tried rehabilitation programs, but could not complete them because of physical and mental problems).
22. This clearly has been an important factor, and is likely to remain so. Taintor
v. Standard Supply & Hardware Co., 398 So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); Lee v.
Pratt-Farnsworth Constr. Co., Inc., 397 So. 2d 2 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); Wilson v.
Ebasco Services, Inc., 393 So. 2d 1248 (La. 1981); Lemoine v. Marksville Indus., Inc.,
391 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
23. Advanced age may suggest difficult re-entry into the job market. Oster v.
Wetzel Printing, Inc., 390 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1980); Celestine v. Henry Indus., Inc., 394
So. 2d 1260 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981). On the other hand, youth (and its handmaidens,
enthusiasm and optimism) might heighten chances for re-employment. Allor v. Belden
Corp., 393 So. 2d 1233 (La. 1981). Again, neither age nor any other single factor need
be conclusive. See Whitaker v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 387 So. 2d 1093 (La. 1980)
(16-year-old entitled to odd-lot classification and to total and permanent disability
benefits because of other factors); Wilson v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 393 So. 2d 1248 (La.
1981) (worker in early 30's classified in odd-lot category because of other factors).
24. By this is meant simply the various types of jobs which an individual has
already held in the marketplace, and thus to which he might return with a minimum of
retraining or rehabilitation. When a worker knows only a single trade, this may point
toward classification in the odd-lot category if other factors are supportive of that
determination. Lee v. Pratt-Farnsworth Constr. Co., Inc., 397 So. 2d 2 (no industrial
history except as truck driver, and he could not return to that trade); Celestine v.
Henry Indus., Inc., 394 So. 2d 1260 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (no industrial history except 30 years as diesel mechanic); Oster v. Wetzel Printing, Inc., 390 So. 2d 1318 (La.
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-education,

or lack of it;25

mental capacity;28
-place of residence;"
-inability to obtain work; 8
-wages actually earned after the injury;"
-

1980) (no industrial history other than bookbinding). On the other hand, a claimant with
a varied work history may fail in his effort to be classed as an odd-lot worker. Allor v.
Belden Corp., 393 So. 2d 1233 (La. 1981) (worker had been a heavy equipment and
truck operator, bartender, service station manager and cook).
25. This had been a critical factor in some cases. Whitaker v. Church's Fried
Chicken, Inc., 387 So. 2d 1093 (La. 1980) (fourth-grade education); Southern Cotton Oil
Co. v. Mitchell, 392 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (fourth-grade education);
Celestine v. Henry Indus., Inc., 394 So. 2d 1260 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981). (seventh-grade
education). If a claimant's education has extended to the high school level, his chances
of retraining are better. Allor v. Belden Corp., 393 So. 2d 1233 (La. 1981).
26. In some instances, retraining might actually be impossible due to limited mental capacity. Turner v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 390 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1980) (evidence of
mental retardation; case remanded), might be such a case. See Morrison-Knudsen Constr.
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 18 Utah 2d 390, 424 P.2d 138 (1967); Rooney v. Charles, 262
Ark. 68, 560 S.W.2d 797 (1978).
27. As suggested in the main ,olume, there is no indication that the legislature
intended that workers move their residence to seek employment. Thus the determination of job availability should be within an area of reasonable proximity to the claimant's residence. See Turner v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 390 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1980)
(worker lived in "small town of Simmesport" according to the court, perhaps suggesting that his employment possibilities were limited); Celestine v. Henry Indus.,
Inc., 394 So. 2d 1260 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1981) (jobs more than three miles from residence
might be difficult to hold because of physical problems in driving that far). See also
Millender v. City of Carrabelle, 128 Fla. 334, 174 So. 2d 740 (1965) (claimant lived in a
small fishing village on the Florida coast with "limited job opportunities").
28. It may be helpful in a close case for an employee to adduce evidence of his unsuccessful attempts to obtain work, or for an employer to adduce evidence that he has
made no such attempts. See, e.g., Taintor v. Standard Supply & Hardware Co., 398 So.
2d 1269 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (claimant able to hold only one job after injury, and
that was a temporary federal government job). See also Stanley v. Master Masonry
Constr., Inc., 287 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1973) (claimant adduced testimony from treating physician, clinical psychologist and owner of a job placement agency; latter testified that he
had made 65 different contacts on the claimant's behalf with no success); Johnson v.
Brasington Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., 265 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972) (two witnesses testified
they denied the claimant a job; he testified as to nine other unsuccessful applications);
Gibson v. Minute Maid Corp., 251 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1971) (evidence of job applications
and denials assisted plaintiffs cause); Clark v. Western Knapp Eng'r Co., 190 So. 2d
334 (Fla. 1966) (claimant unsuccessful, in part because he had weak medical evidence
and did not show efforts to obtain employment). In fact, Florida appears to have
established a rule that a- finding of disability must be accompanied by proof of a bona
fide work search, at least in close cases (perhaps those in which we might say the
claimant had failed to establish a prima facie case for classification in the odd-lot
category). See Brevard Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Caldwell, 397 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. App.
1980).
29. This may be a simple measure of post-injury employability, since it is the most
direct way of determining what employers in the marketplace think of the claimant's
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-future ability to compete in the open labor market;"
-claimant's continued employment in the same job, either with
the assistance of a friendly employer, or without;3 and
-other factors which are relevant to a determination of the
complete picture of regular employment in the job market.2
For their part, employers should be prepared with expert
testimony of their own on the availability of steady employment for
the injured worker. Some of the factors on the above list which appear to point toward prima facie classification in the odd-lot
category may in fact indicate the contrary upon further reflection.
An industry seeking mature, settled workers might see advanced
age as an advantage, for example. The cases in which the employer
has fared best under the doctrine are those in which evidence of
employability was readily available, and the cases in which the
employer has fared worst are those in which no such evidence, or
only limited evidence on the point, was offered. In light of the size
of total and permanent disability benefits these days, it would probably be economically wise for the employer or insurer to do a little
investigation to find some things that the claimant would be able to
do. We would all benefit from that search.
condition. Employment at a virtually identical wage may scuttle the claimant's action
before it gets under way. Hollis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1978); Dusang v. Henry C. Beck Builders, Inc., 389 So. 2d 367 (La. 1980). These facts
can be deceptive, however. If the wage is paid by an accommodating employer, and is
not actually a reflection of competition in the marketplace, this may not be a fair appraisal of the claimant's condition.
30. To a great extent, this determination is a product of consideration of many of
the other factors. See Goodwin v. Stathes, 381 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980);
Taintor v. Standard Supply & Hardware Co., 398 So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 4th. Cir. 1981);
Lemoine v. Marksville Indus., Inc., 391 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
31. Temporary good fortune in obtaining a job, or employment with family or a
friendly employer who makes concessions for the worker's condition, should not of
itself defeat odd-lot classification. Graham v. Jones Bros. Co., Inc., 393 So. 2d 861 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1981) (employed only by a friend after injury); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v.
Mitchell, 392 So. 2d 695 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (employment only in family-owned
business). Return to work at several jobs, only to find that one's physical condition
makes that impossible, is supportive of odd-lot classification. Lemoine v. Marksville Indus., Inc., 391 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981). But returning to similar employment
without substantial complaint suggests, at best, only partial disability and not odd-lot
status. Dusang v. Henry C. Beck Builders, Inc., 389 So. 2d 367 (La. 1980). All of this
may suggest workers are better off not returning to work. If so, the fault lies within
the Act itself. Such cases should be treated as partial disability cases under a measurement of ability to work, not wages actually earned.
32. A given claimant might have language difficulties. Germain v. Cool-Rite Corp.,
70 N.J. 1, 355 A.2d 642 (1976) (Haitian native would encounter additional difficulties in
competitive job market due to language barrier). Or an injury might have left the claimant with an obvious deformity or disfigurement which might deter employers.
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An employer should not be required to single out a specific job
opening for a claimant, down to handing him the job application partially filled out. It should be sufficient that the employer or insurer
respond to the prima facie odd-lot case by demonstrating that even
within the limiting factors discussed above, there are regular callings within the job market which are open to the injured worker.
Some of these might be unusual (at-home assembly employment, for
example), but some creativity and imagination will serve the
employer's position well.
Some aspects of all these factors have been considered in Louisiana decisions to this point, and no doubt others will be as we
become more familiar with experiences in other states." The doctrine is not likely to be universally popular,3' nor will it be without
its rough spots in judicial development. But it offers the best present avenue for interpretation of the post-1975 disability standard.
Role of Working-in-Pain Cases
The adoption of the odd-lot doctrine, especially in working-inpain cases, clarifies the role that these cases should play in the
future. The fact that an individual can demonstrate subjective complaints of substantial pain, corroborated by medical evidence of some
organic bases of these -complaints, is a major step toward classification as an odd-lot worker. Such a fact suggests what has always
been suggested: that the worker who finds himself in that predicament is likely to be among the last to be hired, and may prove to be an
unsatisfactory worker in some occupations because he cannot carry
his share of the load. This may as a practical matter close him out of
some fields and direct him into others. And if no other fields are
readily available to him, he may be entitled to an award of total and
permanent disability. But if he is entitled to such an award, it will
not be solely because he works in substantial pain. Rather, it will be
because his working in pain, in combination with other factors of the
odd-lot doctrine which may apply in his case, makes his steady
employment in a recognized calling in the labor market either highly
doubtful or non-existent. 5
33. See Note, Odd Man In: LouisianaAdopts the Odd-Lot Doctrine-A Suggested
Analysis, 42 LA. L. REV. 821 (1982).
34. See Juge, The Odd-Lot Doctrine, 27 Loy. L. RjEv. 69 (1981).
35. See, for example, the following cases in which pain was a primary though not
the sole reason why the odd-lot doctrine was used to find total and permanent disability.
Taintor v. Standard Supply & Hardware Co., 398 So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981);
Lee v. Pratt-Farnsworth Constr. Co., Inc., 397 So. 2d 2 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); Wilson
v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 393 So. 2d 1248 (La. 1981); Lemoine v. Marksville Indus., Inc.,
391 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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THE "INTENTIONAL ACT" EXCLUSION

Predictably, the "intentional act" loophole which the legislature
left in 1976 as an escape route from the Act was quickly tested for
size, shape and strength. Almost without exception, a narrow interpretation has been adopted. Such an interpretation is consistent not
only with the policy of the Act, but also with the legislative history
of the 1976 amendments.
At this writing some twenty cases have dealt with the problem
of the meaning of the closing paragraph which the legislature added
to section 1032 in 1976:
Nothing in this Chapter shall affect the liability of the
employer ... to a fine or penalty under any other statute or the
liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an intentional act.
Most of the cases presented facts which could have constituted
"gross negligence" (whatever that means) rather than "intentional"
acts in the traditional definition. One of these cases reached the
supreme court, and although it was a weak case on the facts, it appears to be one in which the court committed itself to a properly
narrow reading of the exception. 6
One should consider before turing to these decisions the
legislative history of the "intentional act" exception The exception
was a part of Act 147 of 1976, which began as House Bill No. 354. As
originally introduced, the bill contained an exception from the exclusive coverage of the Act for the liability of the employer
resulting from "an intentional or deliberate act." In that form, one
could certainly have argued that the exception was broader than the
final legislative enactment ("an intentional act"), unless the words intentional and deliberate are synonymous.
A House committee proposed, and the House adopted, an amendment to the exception broadening the exclusive nature of the compensation remedy to other members of the "employment family" (officers, directors, principals, and so on)." During House floor debate
on the bill, two amendments were offered and rejected which would

36. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981) (basically an ordinary negligence
case in which the court of appeal had characterized the conduct as "intentional"; the
court held that the meaning of intent was that "the defendant either desired to bring
about the physical results of his act or believed that they were substantially certain to
follow from what he did").
37.

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF THE STATE OF Lou.

SIANA, 2d Reg. Sess. at 11 (June 3, 1976).
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have expanded the exception to instances of "gross negligence" as
well as to "intentional acts."3
On the Senate side, the words "or deliberate" were removed
from the bill without objection in a floor amendment.39 During that
same debate, two amendments virtually identical to the two offered
in the House were rejected.'" As finally passed, the bill referred only
to "intentional" acts of the employer and others, not to "gross
negligence" nor even to "deliberate" acts.
The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the legislative
process is that both houses of the legislature rejected attempts to
make the exception any broader than "intentional" acts of the
employer, thereby giving the exception a narrow scope.
This conclusion is perfectly compatible with what must have
been the policy behind the 1976 amendments. The "executive
officer" suits had become a major loophole in the Act, and there can
be no doubt that the legislature was acting to close that loophole.
But the legislature was understandably reluctant to sanction all conduct by the employer or a co-employee. One should not permit
another employee to provoke a disagreement with the claimant, batter him, then hide behind the exclusivity provision of the Act. Thus
the legislature provided that such a claimant is not limited to the
Act, but may proceed against the intentional tortfeasor.
However, the policy which requires that an employer or
employee not be able to use the Act as a shield to protect him
against intentional acts which cause harm does not require that an
38. The first amendment would have provided an award of double the normal
compensation against an employer (or others within that term) when the death, injury
or disease "is caused by the employer's violation of a recognized safety rule or regulation, his failure to provide a safety device required by a recognized safety rule or
regulation or by a statute, or by gross negligence on the part of a supervisory
employee ... ."Id. at 20. The second amendment would have provided that the exclusive coverage of the Act did not apply
if such injury or compensable sickness or disease is caused by the gross
negligence, as hereinafter defined, of said party or parties. Gross negligence exists when there is such disregard of the interest of others that the tortfeasor's
conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be
maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances. Ordinary
negligence sufficient to sustain a cause of action under Article 2315 of the Louisiana qivil Code is not sufficient to constitute gross negligence as defined in this
Section.
Id. at 21 (June 4, 1976).
39.

OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF LouI-

SIANA, 2d Reg. Sess. at 21 (June 4, 1976).
40. Id. at 42.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42

injured employee be entitled to proceed in tort against a co-employee or the employer when the conduct falls short of such intent. The
fact that an employer or a co-employee may be headstrong, stubborn, grossly negligent, merely forgetful or callous is nothing other
than one of the various degrees of "fault" in the work place.' Indeed, the employee himself is protected against loss of compensation
benefits for conduct beyond mere negligence. Section 1081 of the
Act, as interpreted, requires nothing short of actual intent to inflict
injury on himself or others in order to establish a defense to a compensation claim. "Gross negligence" as paraphrased in secion 1081
is insufficient as a defense to a compensation suit.
The policy expressed in section 1032 as amended is that all nonintentional acts, of whatever degree of fault, belong within the Act
if they are work-related.
The cases decided since 1976 have respected this policy decision
by the legislature. Most of the factual situations can be described as
ordinary negligence actions; or perhaps gross negligence actions,
masquerading as intentional act cases. The appellate courts have
adopted the traditional definition of intent as either the active
desire of the consequences of one's action or knowledge to a substantial certainty that the consequences will follow the act. Some
early cases stated the definition in the conjunctive, but the supreme
court has recently stated it correctly in the alternative. 2 The traditional definition is simply a way of relieving the claimant of the difficulty of trying to establish subjective state of mind (desiring the
consequences) if he can show substantial certainty that the consequences will follow the act. The latter takes the case out of the
realm of possibility or risk (which are negligence terms), and expresses the concept that an actor with such a certainty cannot be
believed if he denies that he knew the consequences would follow. In
human experience, we know that specific consequences are substantially certain to follow some acts. If the actor throws a bomb into an
office occupied by two persons, but swears that he only "intended"
to hurt one of them, we must conclude that he is nonetheless guilty
41. Professor Larson goes so far as to characterize the narrowness of the exception as follows:
Since the legal justification for the common-law action is the nonaccidental
character of the injury from the defendant employer's standpoint, the common-law
liability of the employer cannot be stretched to include accidental injuries caused

by the gross, wanton, wilful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or
malicious negligence, breach of statute or other misconduct of the employer short
of genuine intentional injury.
2A LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.13 (1976).
42. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981).
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of an intentional tort as to the other, since he knows to a virtual certainty that harmful consequences will follow his conduct, regardless
of his subjective desire.
The Louisiana cases thus far are at best "gross negligence"
cases or perhaps even "deliberate" cases in which the conduct falls
far short of knowledge to a substantial certainty of harmful consequences, and the claimants were properly restricted to their compensation remedy.'" The only exception is an unusual case in which,
43. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981) (sanitation employee sought
recovery against co-employee who was driving sanitation vehicle): Woolridge v.
Mouledoux, 398 So. 2d 1272 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (employee in laundry facility fell
due to accumulation of liquid on floor; alleged various failures on part of co-employees,
including failure to provide safe place to work, to repair, and so on; exception of no
cause of action sustained and affirmed); McDonald v. Bob Bros. Constr. Co., 397 So. 2d
846 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (employee injured after his foot caught in slack cable on
crane boom from which he was descending in response to specific orders; exception of
no cause of action sustained and affirmed); Nugent v. Executive Officers of Harter Oil,
396 So. 2d 537 (La. App: 3d Cir. 1981) (drilling rig employee injured in fall from scaffolding; alleged that officers "intentionally provided" an unsafe work area and "entertained a desire" to bring about his injury; dismissed as "mere conclusions of the
pleader"; exception of no cause of action sustained and affirmed); McAdams v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., Inc., 395 So. 2d 411 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) (employee injured when
his hand came into contact with blades of router; alleged that defendants removed
guards on machine and ordered him to work there, and that this was so "grossly
negligent" that it must be considered intentional; exception of no cause of action sustained and affirmed); Crenshaw v. Service Painting Co., 394 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1981) (employee's dependents argued that his fall from scaffolding was caused by
accumulation of sand from nearby operations, that he did not want to work under
those conditions and complained to supervisor about them; summary judgment for
defendant granted and affirmed); Klohn v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 394 So. 2d
636 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1981) (mechanic's helper in repair of diesel engine fell through
open grate, alleged failure to provide safe place to work; summary judgment for defendant granted and affirmed); Wilson v. Werner Co., Inc., 393 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1981) (iron worker fell from third floor of building under construction; "bare allegations" that employer or principal "wantonly disregarded applicable safety regulations"
insufficient to bring case under intentional act exception; exception of no cause of action sustained and affirmed); Citizen v. Theodore Daigle & Bro., 392 So. 2d 741 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1980) (employee in gun shop injured when another employee jokingly
pointed gun, in for repair, at him, pulled the trigger, and it discharged: shooting
employee did not know that pellet might be lodged in weapon; knew only that it would
not fire when he had tried it earlier; court held that employee intended his act, but
had no desire to inflict injurious consequences, nor was he substantially certain that
they would follow; remedy limited to compensation by trial court, affirmed on appeal);
Waldrop v. Vistron Corp., 391 So. 2d 1274 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1980) (claimant alleged
employer had "intentionally, knowingly and with willful, wanton and reckless
disregard of plaintiff's safety" caused his occupational disease; court affirmed the sustaining of an exception of no cause of action, holding in a particularly forceful opinion
that the alleged conduct did not rise to the level of an intentional tort); Thornhill v.
Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 391 So. 2d 1256 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (young worker
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in fact, the claimant might have been able to state a cause of action
for intentional infliction of mental distress; the court held that summary judgment under the circumstances was inappropriate."
INTERESTING "COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT"

DECISIONS

As is usually the case, a number of interesting "course of

employment" decisions were rendered. While none of the decisions
suffered amputation of left leg after getting it caught in auger rotating in trough
below grain bin he was cleaning; summary judgment for defendant granted and affirmed); Erwin v. Excello Corp., 387 So. 2d 1288 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (claimant injured
hand when it was caught in "Pure Pak" machine making milk cartons; alleged "intentional" failure to repair machine after notice of problems, to use safety devices, incorrect training; judgment rejecting tort claim affirmed); Johnson v. Chicago Mill &
Lumber Co., 385 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980) (employee died when pile of
firewood collapsed on him as he was attempting to load some of it on conveyor belt to
boiler at sawmill; alleged "intentional" piling of wood in unsafe manner, amending
earlier allegation of "willfully and knowingly" doing-the same thing; summary judgment in defendant's favor affirmed); Courtney v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 385 So. 2d
391 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (meter reading employee apparently fell through grate and
onto charged cell and was electrocuted; dependents alleged that conduct was of such a
nature that it was "willful and as such should be classified as intentional"; exception of
no cause of action sustained in trial court and affirmed); MeGuire v. Honeycutt, 387 So.
2d 674 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980 (employee injured in automobile accident in course of
employment; co-employee was at wheel of ambulance-type vehicle; alleged "intentional"
running of red light after seeing no traffic at intersection; verdict in plaintiffs favor
reversed on appeal); Bourgoyne v. City of Baton Rouge, 380 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1979) (motorcycle policeman died after traffic accident during chase of speeding
motorist; failure of police department to provide his motorcycle with siren, arguably
required by statute, not "intentional" so as to permit tort action); Frazier v. Carl E.
Woodward, Inc., 378 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (steel worker fell from perch
and alleged, as to executive officers, "such wantonness and gross negligence amounts
to intentional assault," but court held facts did not support conclusion of intentional
act); Johnson v. Narcisse, 373 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (shipyard worker injured eye during assignment to paint in hold of vessel, arguably in darkened area;
alleged "gross negligence and intentional act" of supervisor in assigning him to dark
area; exception of no cause of action sustained by trial court and affirmed); Tobin v.
Jacobson, 369 So. 2d 1161 (La' App. 1st Cir. 1979) (welder fell to death through
unbarricaded opening; various allegations of disregard of safety procedures, but court
held claimant had to allege desire of consequences or knowledge to substantial certainty; given opportunity to amend to attempt to state cause of action); Guidry v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 359 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978) (young employee lost sight in
eye when knife placed outwards on shelf by co-employee came into contact with eye;
alleged this was "deliberate" but court held desire of consequences or knowledge to
substantial certainty had not been shown).
44. Maggio v. St. Francis Medical Center, 391 So. 2d 948 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980)
(claimant, who had suffered an emotional breakdown, proceeded in tort against his
employer on theory that his immediate supervisor had engaged in a continuing course
of conduct of "harassment, interference, intimidation, unfounded accusations, unreasonable acts," demoting claimant and generally making his life miserable; court held that
allegations might state a cause of action for intentional infliction of mental distress and
that on facts presented, summary judgment was inappropriate).
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breaks new ground, the facts of several of them are intriguing.
Traveling Employees
The opinions in Vickers v. Continental Southern Lines 5 and
Blakeway v. Lefebure Corp." continue the broad coverage given to
those employees whose jobs call for extensive traveling. The survivors of the deceased employee in Vickers were held entitled to
benefits as a result of his death while "traveling." The decedent was
an interstate bus driver, whose usual assignment was the run from
Alexandria to New Orleans, arriving in the late afternoon, and a
return run to Alexandria the next morning. Company policy and
government regulations required such drivers to get eight hours of
rest before making the return trip. In order to encourage compliance with this policy, the company provided free overnight accommodations for the operators in a motel about six blocks from the terminal. The decedent was on his way to the motel from the terminal
when he was struck and killed by a passing motorist.
In Blakeway, an employer sent an employee to a two-week
seminar out of state. Though classes were only Monday to Friday,
the distances involved made it prohibitive for the employee to
return on the intervening weekend. His meals and lodging for the
weekend were paid, but he was otherwise on his own after the last
class on Friday until Monday morning. Just before dawn on Sunday,
after an evening of dining and drinking, the employee was injured
when he dived into the shallow end of the motel swimming pool.
Compensation was granted. The claimant had two arguments strongly
in his favor. First, the "rest period" in which he found himself was
imposed by the dictates of his employer's method of training, and
was sanctioned by the employer's expenditure of funds for the
weekend stay. Second, he benefitted from the liberal treatment
usually accorded to traveling employees.
Recreational Activities
The decision in Jackson v. American Insurance Co.47 is the first
case actually involving an employer-sponsored recreational activity.'
45.

383 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).

46. 393 So. 2d 928 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d 610 (La. 1981) (Marcus, Blanche, and Lemmon, JJ., dissenting from the writ denial).
47. 391 So. 2d 1339 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981) (Marvin, J., dissenting from refusal to
grant a rehearing).
48. Two previous Louisiana cases involved activities which were more social than
recreational, and compensation was denied in each instance. Broussard v. Farm
Storage & Equip., Inc., 236 So. 2d 882 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970) (employee attending
Christmas party was asked by employer to fetch some ice; injured while on apparently
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A consortium composed of ten parishes employed youths at summer
jobs, utilizing federal funds. The employment was limited to a nineweek period. On the last day of the employment term, the immediate supervisor of the workers took them in an employment
vehicle from their last work place to a store and then to a pond outside the city limits for a swimming party to celebrate the end of the
employment period. One of the young workers drowned during the
party.
The trial court held that the death was in the course of and
arose out of the employment, but concluded that the surviving
parents had failed to show economic dependency. Thus the award
was limited to funeral benefits. Both sides appealed, and the appellate court held that the death was not in the course of nor did it
arise out of the employment. The court thus reversed even the
award of funeral benefits.
The appellate court emphasized that attendance at the party
was optional, even though it was held during the work hours and
the participants were transported there by the employer. Previous
wage arrangements made it clear that the workers would be paid
for a full day whether they attended the party or not. Under the circumstances, the court felt that the "work was over" when the swimming expedition started.
There was no dissent from the original opinion, but Judge Marvin
dissented from the refusal to grant a rehearing. His opinion suggested that too little attention had been given to the interdependence of the two factors of arising out of employment and in the
course of employment. The claimants had a strong "in-the-course-of"
argument. The workers were minors, and their adherence to their
supervisor's instructions had previously been an issue (resolved in
the supervisor's favor). They were transported to the activity in an
employment vehicle, and would be returned by the same means at
the end of the day. They thus could benefit from the treatment
given the employee in Matthews v. Milwhite Mud Sales Co.," who
had been transported to a work site by his employer and would be
returned by the same method. He was, according to one version,
fired at the work site but continued to work until injured. The court
personal mission within the warehouse; compensation denied); Courville v. National
Food Stores of La., Inc., 174 So. 2d 251 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965) (no compensation for
death of meat market manager returning home from party given for defendant's outgoing district supervisor but not promoted or financed by defendant, and at which no

company business was transacted).
49.
(1970).

225 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 255 La. 149. 229 So. 2d 732
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held that since the employee had no means of transportation from
the work site back to the office, his employment would include the
return transportation. Compensation was awarded.
The employee in Matthews had a strong showing of "arising-outor' which the decedent in Jackson lacked. Still, the peculiar nature
of the employment program and the focus on the supervisor's authority in Jackson probably should have been given greater importance in the determination of compensability than was evidenced in
the original opinion. Perhaps the court was simply reacting to the
fact that the employment itself was a result of a federal program,
but compensation liability if it existed would be a local responsibility. Even so, a troublesome precedent narrowing the course of employment in employer-sponsored recreational activities will still
have to be reckoned with in the future.
Lunch Hour

The opinions in Wilson v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc.50 and Campbell v. Baker, Culpepper & Brunson" continue the distinction ordinarily made between lunch-hour injuries to those employees who are
paid for the time spent eating lunch, and those who are not. The
claimant in Wilson was an hourly-wage employee whose duties were
not specified but were'obviously not of an executive nature. He had
left the premises during his lunch hour, punched out on the time
clock as he was required to do, and was injured when he was struck
by a vehicle while walking back to work. The evidence demonstrated that the claimant was free to leave the premises for lunch,
and that he was not under the control or supervision of his
employer during that hour nor was he paid for that time. The claimant's allegation that he had certain tasks to perform for his
employer during the lunch hour (which might have made his "in-thecourse-of" argument much stronger) was apparently not supported
by the evidence.
The claimant in Campbell was a young associate in a law firm,
returning from assigned duties out of town. She finished her
business there shortly before noon and stopped at a fast-food
establishment near the highway to pick up something to eat on the
way back to her office. She was injured as she was leaving the parking lot of the establishment to return to the normal route to her
office. She was held to be entitled to benefits. The court noted that
the firm customarily reimbursed employees for mileage and meals
during such assignments.
50.
51.

387 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
382 So. 2d 1046 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
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These results are predictable and probably correct. One
wonders, however, whether a measure of economic discrimination in
the scheme has evolved to deal with these injuries. The claimant
who is least able to bear the costs of an accident (the hourly-wage
employee) is accorded the least expansive coverage for lunch-hour
mishaps because he is ordinarily not compensated for his "lunch
hour." The salaried employee, arguably better able to bear these
costs, is paid in a lump sum and thus may argue that his "lunch
hour" is compensated.
Fights
Recovery was denied to one of two employee combatants in
Augustine v. Washington ParishPolice Jury," but not because the
court felt the fight did not arise out of or occur in the course of
employment. Rather, the court held that the defendant had
established the defense under section 1081 that the claimant's injury
was caused by his "wilful intention to injure himself or to injure
another .. ..
"
The claimant was a road maintenance employee whose normal
working hours were from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. He was free to leave
the work premises, however, whenever he returned there from field
work, which might have been as early as 3:00 or 3:30 p.m. on some
days. On the day in question, the claimant returned from the field a
few minutes early but apparently waited around, either for the
supervisor or for another employee. When the supervisor arrived,
an argument and ultimately a pugilistic encounter ensued between
the claimant and the supervisor. Previous bad blood between the
two was indicated, and the argument was apparently over an accusation that the claimant might have damaged some equipment. As is
almost always the case, the evidence was in conflict about the actual
sequence of events during and just before the fight. The trial court
had determined that the injury did not arise out of the employment
because the claimant chose to remain on the premises after the end
of the work day. The appellate court correctly noted that had the
claimant simply slipped and hurt himself during his brief delay in
leaving the premises after the end of the work day, no one could
seriously have argued that he would not be entitled to compensation. Thus it was appropriate to conclude that his injury occurred in
the course of his employment and arose out of his employment, according to the definitions those terms have received over the years
in the cases. Recovery was another matter, of course, in light of the
fact that a section 1081 defense was established by the defendant.
52.

383 So. 2d 1271 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 1379 (La. 1980).
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Threshold Doctrine
The journey to and from employment is ordinarily not covered
by the Act. An exception to the rule of non-coverage may be made
out if the employee faces a distinctive travel risk in going to or coming from work and this risk exists in an area immediately adjacent
to his place of work. The parameters of this exception vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and they exist primarily for the purpose
of keeping the exception within some reasonable administrative
bounds.
A recent Louisiana decision illustrates the exception well, and
properly suggests that the exception is not limited to railroad
tracks, tunnels and other such highway risks which are usually
associated with the exception." In Thomasee v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,' a municipal clerical employee had been working until
8:00 p.m. one winter evening in a building being used temporarily as
a city hall. She had been requested, along with other employees, to
park in a lot belonging to the local police jury in order to leave sufficient on-street parking for others who might visit city hall. The
parking lot was actually the foundation of a razed high school, and
was some 20 concrete steps above street level. The steps were uneven and broken, and no handrail had been provided. The claimant
slipped on the steps in the dark and injured her wrist. The court
properly held that the case fell within the threshold doctrine, and
permitted recovery.
INTOXICATION As A DEFENSE

For the first time in a long while, the defense of intoxication
was successfully urged at the appellate level in two separate decisions. A sharply-divided supreme court (4 to 3) in Parker v.
Kroger's, Inc.55 denied the claim of a truck driver who had consumed
"four to eight 10-ounce cans of beer" during a July 4th afternoon
barbecue and then suffered serious injuries by running into a barricade on a trip that night to Houston. A blood test showed 0.104
percent by weight of alcohol, and a beer can was found in the cab of
the truck. The court reasoned that even if the driver had fallen
53. Occasionally, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has indicated that the exception
should be limited to such hazards. Templet v. Intracoastal Truck Line, Inc., 255 La.

193. 230 So. 2d 74 (1969). Such an interpretation makes the exception too narrow; the
important factor is the distinctiveness of the travel risk, which makes it possible for
reasonable administrative boundaries to be drawn to separate that risk from those to
which the employee is equally exposed along with the remainder of the population.
54. 385 So. 2d 1219 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
55. 394 So. 2d 1178 (La. 1981) (Calogero, Dennis and Watson, JJ., dissenting).
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asleep (as he alleged), his intoxication would have induced drowsiness, and therefore could be said to have caused the injury.
In Renfroe v. City of New Orleans,56 the court resolved a
disputable "arising out of and in the course of" problem in the claimant's favor, but then denied recovery on the ground that his intoxication was the cause of his *injury. The claim was made by survivors
for the death of a police officer who had been part of a special detail
hired and paid by General Motors to protect certain executives.
That assignment included driving automobiles furnished by General
Motors to transport the executives. At the completion of the assignment in the afternoon, the officer was permitted to retain the vehicle
until the next morning. That evening, the various participants in the
special detail met for a night of dining and drinking to celebrate the
successful completion of the assignment. Extensive testimony established that the officer in question was substantially intoxicated
by the time he left for his home. He was killed when his car rolled
off the interstate highway after striking the curb. A blood test
revealed an alcohol level of 0.23 percent. The court noted that section 1081 does not require that an accident be caused "solely" by intoxication, but that if it should be so interpreted, this accident was
caused solely by the officer's intoxication.
The opinion in Renfroe distinguishes the decision a few years
ago in Ray v. Superior Iron Works & Supply Co., Inc., 7 in which the
appellate court had taken such a narrow view of the intoxication
defense as virtually to eliminate it from the Act.'
These two decisions appear proper on the facts presented, and
may restore the defense of intoxication to its proper place in the
Act. They should not be taken as a general re-introduction of employee fault into the compensation scheme, but rather as a demonstration that when intoxication is a substantial cause of the injury,
the Act requires a denial of compensation. One can expect, of course,
that the defense will continue to be subjected to rigorous judicial
scrutiny, and may often be rejected."'
56. 394 So. 2d 787 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 So. 2d 621 (La. 1981) (Dennis, J., dissenting from the writ denial).
57. 284 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 So. 2d 365 (La. 1973). The
claimant had been drinking off and on for about ten hours before his vehicle failed to
negotiate a curve and he was injured. A blood test revealed an alcohol content of
0.26%. The court held that the defendant's evidence failed to establish that intoxication was the cause of the claimant's injuries.
58. See 2 W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 344 in 14 LOUISIANA Cxvii, LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1980).
59. See Miller v. Lake Forest, Inc., 370 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied,
372 So. 2d 1046 (La. 1979) (air conditioning repairman equipped with "beeper" for after-
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MISCELLANEOUS 60

Judicial Discussion of Settlement with Claimant

A recent decision suggests that greater caution must be exercised
in the compromise and settlement process. Section 1272 of the Act
requires that any proposed compromise be presented to the district
judge by a joint petition and that the judge "shall, in every case,
discuss the settlement and its terms with the employee or his
dependents." The claimant in Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc."1 filed
an action to nullify a compromise and settlement on the ground that
the trial judge had approved the compromise without discussing it
with him. Both the trial court and the appellate court rejected the
claimant's request, though on slightly different grounds.2
The supreme court, however, reversed the lower courts and held
that a petition alleging failure to discuss the compromise with the
claimant stated a cause of action for nullity of the judgment. The
court reasoned that the requirement of section 1272 was mandatory
and failure to follow the requirement could be asserted by means of
an action to nullify a final judgment under article 2004 of the Code
of Civil Procedure." This remedy is supplemental to that provided
in the Act itself on the grounds of "fraud or misrepresentation."
hours service calls and permitted to take employer's van home spent several hours
after work at restaurant; probably negligent in driving from restaurant to his home;
an investigating officer smelled alcohol on employee's breath when he arrived at accident scene, but did not order blood test; defense of intoxication held not established;
court noted that loss of control of the vehicle did not necessarily establish intoxication,
since "many sober drivers lose control of their cars and run off the road." 370 So. 2d at
649.
60. Worthy of mention but not textual discussion are: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Paramount Drilling Co., 395 So. 2d 849 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981) ("direct" relationship of lending employer and borrowing employer will prevail and require sharing of compensation
loss, over possible "indirect" relationship of principal and actual employer under section 1061 of the Act, which would call for indemnity of principal by actual employer);
Landry v. Benson & Gold Chevrolet, 398 So. 2d 1262 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981) (car
salesman had use of demonstrator, and was returning home for some sales folders
when cement truck backed into him; pursuit of offender took two-mile detour and
45-minute delay, and allegedly caused heart attack; court held salesman to be in course
of employment but denied benefits due to lack of proof of causal connection between
incident and disabling heart attack).
61. 392 So. 2d 398 (La. 1980) (Dixon and Dennis, JJ., dissenting).
62. Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc., 383 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
63. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2004 provides:
A final judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices may be annulled.
An action to annul a judgment on these grounds must be brought within one
year of the discovery by the plaintiff in the nullity action of the fraud or ill practices.
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Refusal to Furnish Proper Medical Treatment
The opinion in Sam v; Standard Fittings Co."4 points up a problem in section 1314 which is likely to become more serious as time
goes on. Amendments to the section in 1950 permitted the court to
overrule the exception of prematurity if the claimant successfully
showed that he had not been "furnished the proper medical attention." 5 The cases have to this point divided the issue of proper
medical attention from the issue of actual payment of the medical
bills."
The facts in Sam required the court to interpret the concept of
furnishing proper medical attention. The claimant alleged that he
was injured in late 1976, and had been paid weekly benefits. But he
alleged that some $40,000 in medical bills were unpaid at the time of
filing the original petition in mid-1978. After the petition was filed
but prior to trial, the employer paid the total medical expenses then
due and sought the dismissal of the suit on an exception of prematurity.
The trial court overruled the exception, but a divided appellate
court reversed. The appellate court noted that the employer had authorized medical services to be furnished to the claimant, and that
such services had (with the exception of a one-day delay for obtaining approval) regularly been furnished by hospitals and doctors. In
keeping with the decisions in earlier cases, the court held that proper
medical attention had been furnished, even though a large amount of
bills were unpaid.
One judge, concurring in the result, noted the hardships placed
upon a claimant by such a result. A claimant who becomes concerned
(as well he might be) over unpaid medical expenses for which he is
probably primarily liable is put to the expense of a law suit in order
to attempt to compel the employer or insurer to pay the expenses.
The employer or insurer may delay paying the bills with impunity,
responding only when sued; and may put an end to the suit by doing
so. The suit is at the expense of the claimant, who is not entitled to
penalties and attorney's fees for the delay, since his claim is dismissed
as premature.67 Moreover, in such an instance, is the employer "fur64. 389 So. 2d 729 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1981)
(case settled).
65. 1950 La. Acts, No. 539.
66. See 2 W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 58, at § 383.
67. Sam v. Standard Fittings Co., 389 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); Moore v.
American Motorist Ins. Co., 216 So. 2d 674 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 253

La. 629, 218 So. 2d 902 (1969).
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nishing" the medical treatment as required by the statute, or are
the hospitals and doctors "furnishing" the treatment?
A dissenting judge worried about prescriptive problems that the
claimant might encounter. If Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1209 is
interpreted to provide a one-year prescriptive period on actions for
payment of medical expenses," and if Louisiana Revised Statutes
23:1314 is interpreted to forbid a claimant from seeking payment of
medical expenses so long as he is being furnished proper medical attention, might he not be foreclosed from seeking payment of those
expenses even though prescription is running against him? Suppose
in Sam that the employer had not chosen to pay the medical bills
prior to trial, but had insisted that proper medical attention was being furnished the claimant and his suit was premature? Other cases
have indicated that a separate suit may be brought to compel payment of medical expenses, but that may be inconsistent with the
provisions of section 1314. The claimant in Sam sought only payment of the medical expenses, but his suit was deemed "premature."
The supreme court granted a writ in Sam, but subsequently
dissolved the writ upon representation by the parties that the matter
had been settled.
There is of course no indication of what the legislature may
have meant by the phrase "furnished the proper medical attention."
Given that the claimant is probably going to be treated by the doctors and hospitals as primarily responsible for payment of the expenses, it would not be inappropriate for the legislature to amend
section 1314 to permit, for example, the sustaining of an exception
of prematurity only when proper medical attention had been furnished and outstanding expenses authorized by the employer or insurer have been paid within sixty days of their receipt.
Hernia
This troublesome area of the law continues to be so. The very
short statutory period for being seen by a physician after the alleged
injury has virtually been eliminated by the decision in Freechou v.
Thomas W. Hooley, Inc. 9 The Act requires that the employee report
the injury "promptly" and be "attended by a licensed physician
within thirty days thereafter.'"0 The claimant in Freechou reported

68.
n.20.
69.
70.

See 2 W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 58. at § 384, especially text at
383 So. 2d 337 (La. 1980).
LA. R.S. 23:1221(4)(q)(i) (Supp. 1975).
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the incident promptly, but did not seek medical attention until three
months later. Over the vigorous dissent of three justices, the majority
of the supreme court held that the claimant need see a physician
within thirty days of the incident only "if timely advised or instructed to do so by his employer."' Though one may sympathize
with the majority's compassion for the claimant, the language of the
Act is clear on the point and should be enforced as written until
amended by the legislature. 2 Issues of prescription in hernia cases
also occupied the judiciary during this term. Some confusion may
result from the decision in Lester v. Rebel Crane & Service Co."
The claimant was injured on June 15, 1974 and required two surgical interventions. In September, 1974 an incisional hernia developed
at the point of the original surgery and was repaired. The hernia
reoccurred in February, 1975 and was repaired in March, 1975.
Again the hernia appeared on March 10, 1976 and was repaired on
March 3, 1977. And the hernia reappeared in January, 1978 and was
corrected on March 30, 1978. Wages were paid in lieu of compensation periodically during these periods of hospitalization and disability,
and the last such payment was on April 20, 1978. Suit was filed on
February 28, 1979, and both lower courts ultimately determined the
action to be prescribed."'
The supreme court reversed, holding that the claimant's suit
was not prescribed. The precise reasoning is elusive. At one point,
the court stated that the prescriptive period of two years from the
accident for "developing" injuries was inapplicable to the case,
because the injury was immediately apparent. But at the end of the
opinion, the court noted that the "payments of wages in lieu of compensation interrupted the two year prescriptive period. . . ."

For

good measure, the court observed that the last wage payment in
lieu of compensation was within one year of the suit, and that the
claimant was "discouraged" from seeking benefits by the payment of
wages in lieu of compensation.
In a footnote, the court offered an alternative ground for its
holding. Since Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1221(4)(q) provides
71. 383 So. 2d at 340-41.
72. See also Carmouche v. Haynes Lumber Co., Inc., 378 So. 2d 466 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 1114 (La. 1980), holding that it is sufficient that the
claimant be attended by a physician within thirty days even though the presenting
complaint is not hernia.
73. 393 So. 2d 674 (La. 1981) (Blanche, J., dissenting).
74. Lester v. Rebel Crane & Serv. Co., 381 So. 2d 1318 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
75. This statement seems incorrect. As noted by Justice Blanche in his dissenting
opinion, payment of benefits interrupts the one-year period running from the accident,
not the two-year period for "developing" injuries.
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special rules for hernias, and treats each recurrence of a hernia
following surgery as a separate hernia, a suit would be timely if filed
within one year of the last recurrence. The last recurrence was in
January, 1978, and the court opined that suit was filed "within one
year" on February 28, 1979-which is in fact more than one year
from the recurrence itself, though less than a year from the corrective surgery.
The supreme court's result may be correct, but the reasoning
should be clarified. The court had properly held a few years earlier
that the two-year period for "developing" injuries under section
1209 did not apply to inguinal hernia cases, since the legislature had
made specific provision for such cases."8 The case so holding involved
a claimant who had three recurrences after the original hernia. He
filed suit within one year of the last recurrence, but more than one
year after the payment of the last compensation benefits and more
than two years after the original accident. The court ultimately held
that a suit filed within one year of the last recurrence was timely,
since the hernia provisions term each recurrence after surgery "a
separate hernia."
The only difference in Lester is that the suit was filed within
one year of the last payment based on the last recurrence though it
was filed more than one year from the recurrence and more than
two years from the original injury. The court should simply have
held that timeliness under either the one-year-from-accident rule or
the one-year-from-last-payment rule will suffice, with the understanding that in hernia cases, each recurrence after corrective
surgery is a new "accident."
One problem still exists with this rationale, and it is not insignificant. The hernia provisions refer to "inguinal" hernias, not incisional or other hernias. There is no difference in the recurrence
problems, and therefore perhaps an extension to incisional hernias is
justified in keeping with the policy of the section. Legislative correction is indicated.
Compensation for Deputy Sheriffs
The writer has elsewhere urged that the denial of compensation
to deputy sheriffs on the grounds that they are "public officials"
rather than "employees" is erroneous and should be changed. 7
Recently, the supreme court adhered to that suggesti6n, though not

76.

77.

Owens v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 307 So. 2d 313 (La. 1975).
1 W. MALONE & A. JOHNSON, supra note 4, at § 98.
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8 the court resolved a
in a compensation case. In Foster v. Hampton,"
difficult factual situation by holding that the state rather than an individual sheriff is the employer of a deputy sheriff. The issue was
one of tort liability, not entitlement to compensation benefits. But
the holding was thereafter applied in a compensation proceeding."9
The court in that proceeding remanded the case to permit the
joinder of the state as employer of the claimant deputy sheriff (in
place of the sheriff), and suggested that a deputy might be jointly
employed by two or more employers."0

More recently, in Phillips v. State ex reL Department of
Transporation,1 an appellate court held squarely that the logical
result of these cases, and the wiser policy, was that deputy sheriffs
should be considered employees for the purposes of workers' compensation. The court thus reversed the decision of the trial court
which had denied compensation to a deputy injured during a routine
police call when his vehicle hit a large hole in a road supposedly
maintained by the defendant state department." The court reasoned
that if the deputy in Foster v. Hampton was an employee of the
state for purposes of respondeat superior, then he should be an
employee for purposes of the compensation statute. The fact that
section 1034 of the Act specifically covers Orleans Parish deputy
sheriffs without mentioning those of any other parish was explained
by the court as being a situation in which the legislature was misled
by the "public official" status which had been given to deputies in
earlier cases. The decision in Phillips seems to be that the "public
official" category was improper from the beginning, and that deputy
sheriffs fall within the basic category of employees, thus making the
Orleans Parish special coverage superfluous. The approach taken in
the Phillips opinion is sound and should be followed.
78. 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977); 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980). For a full discussion of the
Foster decision, see Comment, PrescribingSolidarity: Contributing to the Indemnity
Dilemma, 41 LA. L. REV. 659 (1981).
79. Rodrigue v. Breaux, 388 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
80. In doing so, the court conceded it also had been deceived by the turn of events
in Foster v. Hampton. In Michaelman v. Amiss, 376 So. 2d 1029 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1979), between the first and second Foster decisions, the appellate court held that the
state was not the employer of a deputy sheriff, asserting that the statement to the
contrary in Foster I was dictum. But in Michaelman v. Amiss, 385 So. 2d 404 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1980), the court stated that it was convinced from Foster II that the supreme
court "intends that a deputy sheriff be recognized as an employee of the State

regardless of the factual situation."
81.

400 So. 2d 1091 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).

82. The court noted that the fact that the deputy was employed by one department or division of the state, and alleged injury at the hands of employees of another
division, did not entitle him to proceed in tort, in the absence of a showing that these
were truly separate "capacities" of the employer. See Wright v. Moore, 380 So. 2d 172
(L. App. 1st Cir. 1979), and discussion in Johnson, supra note 2, at 575-78.

